Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness

Abstract
Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content
Keywords Consciousness  Nonconceptual content  Subjectivity  Kant  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2011.595197
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.

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