Analyse & Kritik 21 (1):25-40 (1999)

Peter Schaber
University of Zürich
It is a widely held view in moral philosophy that reasons for action are based on desires. This view should be rejected. Reasons for action are never provided by desires. Desires provide us with motives, whereas reasons for action are based on valuable facts which obtain independently of our desires. The recognition of these reasons does not necessarily motivate us. Motives depend on desires, for instance the motive for moral actions on the desire to do the morally right thing
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DOI 10.1515/auk-1999-0102
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