Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):57-65 (2021)

Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Abstract
A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalyzable.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.18290/rf21691-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

.R. G. Swinburne - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
The Self and the Future.Bernard Williams - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):161-180.
Reductionism and the First Person.John McDowell - 1997 - In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 230--50.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Concept of Personal Identity.Steven Rieber - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.
Asymmetric Personal Identity.Theodore Sider - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):127-146.
Personal Identity and Time.Quentin Smith - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):155-167.
The Crucial Relation in Personal Identity.Patricia Kitcher - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):131 - 145.
Hume and Reid on Personal Identity.Paul Chester Boling - 1989 - Dissertation, The University of Tennessee
Personal Identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
Personal Identity.John Campbell - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
Human Identity and Bioethics.David DeGrazia - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-03-19

Total views
117 ( #92,983 of 2,455,878 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #17,795 of 2,455,878 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes