Opportunity and preference learning

Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

:Robert Sugden has suggested a normative standard of freedom as ‘opportunity’ that is supposed to help realign normative economics – with its traditional rational choice orientation – with behavioural economics. While allowing preferences to be incoherent, he wants to maintain the anti-paternalist stance of orthodox welfare economics. His standard, though, presupposes that people respond to uncertainty about their own future preferences by dismissing any kind of self-constraint. We argue that the approach lacks psychological substance: Sugden's normative benchmark – the ‘responsible person’ – can hardly serve as a convincing role model in a contractarian setting. An alternative concept is introduced, and some implications are briefly discussed.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On Preference and Freedom.Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198.
Position preference and discrimination learning.Marvin H. Goer - 1958 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (5):492.
Right-response preference in probability learning and reversal.Marilyn E. Miller - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (5):776.
A model of non-informational preference change.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.
Sympathy, commitment, and preference.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):33-50.
On the Analysis of Negative Freedom.Martin van Hees - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (2):175-197.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-08-27

Downloads
16 (#880,136)

6 months
4 (#818,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Welfare, happiness, and ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Inequality Reexamined.Amartya Sen - 1927 - Oxford University Press UK.
Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
Inequality Reexamined.John Roemer & Amartya Sen - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):554.

View all 29 references / Add more references