On being unreasonable

Philosophy of Science 40 (1):1-9 (1973)
The problem of the critical assessment of theories across paradigms raised by Kuhn is not resolved, it is argued, either by Scheffler's appeal to initial credibility or by Lakatos' conception of a research program. It is argued further that, in these contexts, the notion of reasonable choice by individuals makes no sense. The conclusion supports Feyerabend's position of "epistemological anarchism."
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DOI 10.1086/288492
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Rational Choice and Public Affairs.Tibor R. Machan - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (3):229-258.
Paradigms in Educational Inquiry.Jerome A. Popp - 1975 - Educational Theory 25 (1):28-39.
A Reply to Brainerd.Sidney Strauss - 1974 - Cognition 3 (2):155-185.

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