On is an ought: Levels of analysis and the descriptive versus normative analysis of human reasoning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):101-102 (2009)
Algorithmic-level specifications carry part of the explanatory burden in most psychological theories. It is, thus, inappropriate to limit a comparison and evaluation of theories to the computational level. A rational analysis considers people's goal-directed and environmentally adaptive rationality; it is not normative. Adaptive rationality is by definition non-absolute; hence, neither deductive logic nor Bayesian probability theory has absolute normative status
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000478
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