Propositional attitudes

Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73 (2006)
The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.
Keywords Attitude  Folk Psychology  Metaphysics  Mind  Propositional Attitudes
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00010.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Peter Goldie (2007). Emotion. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):928–938.

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