Propositional attitudes

Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,589

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Propositional Attitudes.Mark Richard - 1997 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 324–356.
Propositional Attitudes.David Lindeman - 2021 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Propositional Attitudes.John Heil - 1996 - ProtoSociology 8:53-67.
Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
Propositional Attitudes In Fiction.John Zeimbekis - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran, Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.
From tracking relations to propositional attitudes.Adam Morton - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):7-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
383 (#84,082)

6 months
25 (#151,463)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy Schroeder
Rice University

Citations of this work

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations