Perception and Practical Knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152 (2011)
According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which its special character consists in the particular causal role of an agent’s self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about.
Keywords Action  Self-Knowledge  Non-Observational Knowledge  Anscombe, G.E.M.  Practical Knowledge
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2011.569749
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Schwenkler (2013). The Objects of Bodily Awareness. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.

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