Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152 (2011)

Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Abstract
According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which its special character consists in the particular causal role of an agent’s self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about.
Keywords Action  Self-Knowledge  Non-Observational Knowledge  Anscombe, G.E.M.  Practical Knowledge
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2011.569749
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References found in this work BETA

How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Objects of Bodily Awareness.John Schwenkler - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.
Agency and Observation in Knowledge of One's Own Thinking.Casey Doyle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):148-161.
Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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