Perception and Practical Knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152 (2011)
Abstract
According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which its special character consists in the particular causal role of an agent’s self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about.
Keywords Action  Self-Knowledge  Non-Observational Knowledge  Anscombe, G.E.M.  Practical Knowledge
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2011.569749
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References found in this work BETA
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Objects of Bodily Awareness.John Schwenkler - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
Non-Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.
Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Campbell Lucy - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-25.

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