Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection

Cognition 141:127-137 (2015)
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DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015
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References found in this work BETA
The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell. pp. 128-159.

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Citations of this work BETA
Two Types of Debunking Arguments.Peter Königs - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-29.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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Philosophical Expertise and Scientific Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.
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