Potential congruence

In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press (2008)
Morality can hardly perform a function, which is discussed in this chapter, unless it offers directives that not only can but frequently do differ from those of self-interest itself. The idea of potential congruence asserts that the relation between morality and the interests of the individual agent is characterized by a high degree of mutual accommodation, so that the frequency and severity of conflict between these two perspectives is significantly reduced. Conflicts are nevertheless possible in principle, but the extent to which they arise in practice is not fixed or immutable. Instead, the frequency of conflict depends to a considerable degree on the character of the prevailing social and political institutions. Achieving convergence between morality and self-interest is in part a social and political task. The account of the “priority” of morality developed by Thomas Scanlon in his book What We Owe to Each Other is similar in a number of respects to this chapter's account of potential congruence.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305845.003.0007
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,786
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium.Brian Berkey - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3015-3035.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
6 ( #627,513 of 2,231,530 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #190,228 of 2,231,530 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature