Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

Noûs:1-50 (2018)

Authors
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
Keywords consciousness  perceptual experience  capacities  phenomenal character
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
DOI 10.1111/nous.12209
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
A Defense of Holistic Representationalism.Jacob Berger - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):161-176.
Consciousness and the Limits of Memory.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5217-5243.

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