Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases

In Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-95 (2017)
Authors
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
This paper argues for a sufficient evidence condition on knowledge and I argue that there is no belief condition on knowledge.
Keywords perceptual knowledge  Gettier cases  sufficient evidence condition on knowledge  factive evidence  capacities
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links
  • This entry has no external links. Add one.

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Clocks, Evidence, and the “Truth-Maker Solution”.John Biro - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):377-381.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Authentic Gettier Cases: A Reply to Starmans and Friedman.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):666-669.
Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Taking 'Know' for an Answer: A Reply to Nagel, San Juan, and Mar.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):662-665.
Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):31-44.
Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases.Jim Stone - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.
Showing the Time.J. Biro - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):57-62.
Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.
Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to Atkins.Mizrahi Moti - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):129-139.
What is True. Gettier Cases and the Problem of Truth.Henk bij de Weg - manuscript
The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
Getting Over Gettier.Alan Musgrave - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-05

Total views
252 ( #43,612 of 2,507,565 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #25,604 of 2,507,565 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes



Home | New books and articles | Bibliographies | Philosophy journals | Discussions | Article Index | About PhilPapers | API | Contact us | Code of conduct

CDP Phiosophy Documentation Center
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation

Server: philpapers-web-6554db7cdd-ck8wg N