In Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-95 (2017)

Authors
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
This paper argues for a sufficient evidence condition on knowledge and I argue that there is no belief condition on knowledge.
Keywords perceptual knowledge  Gettier cases  sufficient evidence condition on knowledge  factive evidence  capacities
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):31-44.
Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases.Jim Stone - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.
Showing the Time.J. Biro - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):57-62.
Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-05

Total views
166 ( #60,722 of 2,433,399 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #11,048 of 2,433,399 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes