Phenomenal dispositions

Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.

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Author's Profile

Henry Ian Schiller
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Acts of Desire.Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):955-972.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

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