Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980 (2020)
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Abstract |
In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
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Keywords | phenomenal intentionality phenomenal character belief alief dispositions |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11229-018-01909-9 |
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Acts of Desire.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
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2018-07-25
Total views
452 ( #15,738 of 2,419,961 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #13,938 of 2,419,961 )
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