Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896 (2016)
Abstract
Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases
Keywords Phenomenal evidence  Factive evidence  Perception  Capacities  Justification  Epistemic transparency  Speckled hen  Evil demon
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0528-8
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):897-905.
Please Mind the Gappy Content.Johan Gersel - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Experiential Evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.
Perceptual Evidence and the Capacity View.Ram Neta - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):907-914.

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