Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946 (2016)

Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I show why a perceiver’s belief is better justified than the belief of someone who suffers a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. I show, moreover, why the capacity view is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. In response to Ram Neta, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence, as well as the notion of evidence in light of an externalism about perceptual content
Keywords Phenomenal evidence  Factive evidence  Perceptual capacities  Degrees of justification  Rational confidence  Bayesianism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0534-x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Westview Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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