Authors
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
University of Southampton
Abstract
The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic’s terms. The sceptical problem cannot, therefore, be answered ‘directly’. Rather, the assumptions that give rise to it, need to be undermined. These include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge, that the ‘Indistinguishability Argument’ renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ is coherent, and the demand for a ‘global validation’ of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are undermined, the path is clear for a ‘realism without empiricism’ that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1163/22105700-bja10001
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,795
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Illusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press UK.
The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.
Response to Critics.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-17.
Probability, Certainty and Illusions.F. A. Siegler - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):91 – 115.
Sceptical Readings of the Cartesian Doubt.Massimo Marilli - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3):387-414.
Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
‘Hinge Propositions’ and the ‘Logical’ Exclusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):165-181.
Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
On the Nature of Philosophical Scepticism.Joseph A. Volpe - 1985 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-22

Total views
17 ( #597,676 of 2,425,652 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #122,932 of 2,425,652 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes