Perceptual Particularity


Authors
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
Keywords Philosophy of Mind  Singular Content  Reference  Perception  Perceptual Particularity
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12278
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Reference Book.John Hawthorne & David Manley - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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