Hume Studies 34 (2):189-208 (2008)

Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin
Can desires and actions be evaluated as responsive or unresponsive to reasons, in ways that extend beyond the instrumental implications of one's (other) desires? And does there exist any form of inference or reasoning that is practical in nature? Hume is generally supposed to have given an unambiguously negative reply to both of these questions. In particular, he is often taken to have held that no desire, passion, or action may ever be said to be opposed to reasons, except (perhaps) in so far as it is based on a false belief or confused piece of means-ends reasoning. And he is generally taken to have held that the existence of some sort of peculiarly practical form of inference or reasoning is fundamentally ..
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI 10.1353/hms.0.0016
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Was Hume a Humean?Elijah Millgram - 1995 - Hume Studies 21 (1):75-93.

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