Plural self-awareness
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24 (2014)
Abstract
It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) it is neither the case that the sense in question has the community (or “us”) in its content or as its object nor does the attitude in question presuppose a preexistent community (or “us”) as its subject. (2) The “sense of ‘us’” is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (3) Plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the individual mind. (4) The most important conceptions of plural subjects, collective persons, or group agents in the current literature fail to recognize the nature and role of plural self-awareness, and therefore fall short in important respects. (5) In spite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mind, there are important differences to consider. The authority of the singular first person point of view has no equivalent in the plural caseAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11097-013-9317-z
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Citations of this work
Emotional sharing and the extended mind.Felipe León, Thomas Szanto & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4847-4867.
Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification.Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):251-260.
Empathy≠sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology.Dan Zahavi & Philippe Rochat - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:543-553.
What is a mode account of collective intentionality?Michael Schmitz - 2017 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peters (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses. Cham: Springer. pp. 37-70.
Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian Account.Thomas Szanto - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):503-527.
References found in this work
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.