Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief

Noûs 47 (1):193-218 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12006
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher-Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
Immoderately Rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.
Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

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