Authors
Jonah N. Schupbach
University of Utah
Abstract
When scientists seek further confirmation of their results, they often attempt to duplicate the results using diverse means. To the extent that they are successful in doing so, their results are said to be robust. This paper investigates the logic of such "robustness analysis" [RA]. The most important and challenging question an account of RA can answer is what sense of evidential diversity is involved in RAs. I argue that prevailing formal explications of such diversity are unsatisfactory. I propose a unified, explanatory account of diversity in RAs. The resulting account is, I argue, truer to actual cases of RA in science; moreover, this account affords us a helpful, new foothold on the logic undergirding RAs.
Keywords Robustness Analysis  Bayesianism  General Philosophy of Science  Explanatory Reasoning
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axw008
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References found in this work BETA

Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):381-390.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.

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Citations of this work BETA

Robustness and Independent Evidence.Jacob Stegenga & Tarun Menon - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):414-435.
When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.
Robust Realism for the Life Sciences.Markus Eronen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2341-2354.
Psychopathology and Truth: A Defense of Realism.Markus I. Eronen - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4):507-520.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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