Oxford University Press (2003)

G. F. Schueler
University of Delaware
People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons.
Keywords Intentionality (Philosophy  Practical reason
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Reprint years 2004, 2005
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Call number B105.I56.S39 2003
ISBN(s) 0807855626   0199250375   9780199250370   9780199278459   0199278458   9780807855621
DOI 10.1215/00318108-114-3-411
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Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.

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