Rodopi (2009)
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The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman¿s replies in the sixth ...
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Keywords | Knowledge, Theory of Social epistemology |
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Call number | B945.G594.R45 2009 |
ISBN(s) | 9789042028104 9042028106 9789042028104 |
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