Reflection, reason, and free will

Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84 (2007)
Abstract
Ju¨rgen Habermas has a familiar style of compatibilism to offer, according to which a person has free will insofar as that person responds appropriately to her reasons. But because of the ways in which Habermas understands reasons and causes, he sees a special objection to his style of compatibilism: it is not clear that our reasons can suitably cause our responses. This objection, however, takes us out of the realm of free will and into the realm of mental causation. In this response to Habermas, I focus on the details of his style of compatibilism. I suggest that, while the basic picture is appealing, three key details of it are problematic
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DOI 10.1080/13869790601170177
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Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Rationality in Action: A Symposium.John R. Searle, Barry Smith, Leo Zaibert & Josef Moural - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66 – 94.

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