Replacing truth

Abstract
Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. That is, our conceptual competence leads us into inconsistency. I call this alternative the inconsistency approach to the liar. Although this approach has many positive features, I argue that several of the well-developed versions of it that have appeared recently are unacceptable. In particular, they do not recognize that if truth is an inconsistent concept, then we should replace it with new concepts that do the work of truth without giving rise to paradoxes. I outline an inconsistency approach to the liar paradox that satisfies this condition
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ISBN(s) 9780199653850
DOI 10.1080/00201740701698589
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References found in this work BETA
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why Philosophers Shouldn’T Do Semantics.Herman Cappelen - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):743-762.
Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
Conceptual Ethics II.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102-1110.
So Truth is Safe From Paradox: Now What?Stewart Shapiro - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):445-455.
Conflicting Rules and Paradox.Colin Johnston - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):410-433.

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