Replacing truth


Authors
Kevin Scharp
Ohio State University
Abstract
Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. That is, our conceptual competence leads us into inconsistency. I call this alternative the inconsistency approach to the liar. Although this approach has many positive features, I argue that several of the well-developed versions of it that have appeared recently are unacceptable. In particular, they do not recognize that if truth is an inconsistent concept, then we should replace it with new concepts that do the work of truth without giving rise to paradoxes. I outline an inconsistency approach to the liar paradox that satisfies this condition
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 9780199653850
DOI 10.1080/00201740701698589
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457.
Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes?Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):299-352.
Conceptual Ethics II: Conceptual Ethics II.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102-1110.
Why Philosophers Shouldn’T Do Semantics.Herman Cappelen - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):743-762.

View all 37 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists?Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
Truth, the Liar, and Relativism.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):427-510.
Alethic Vengeance.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
957 ( #2,061 of 2,319,409 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
107 ( #3,630 of 2,319,409 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature