Self-Knowledge and Its Limits

Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):85-95 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This is a review essay of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford, 2014) and John Doris, Talking to Our Selves (Oxford, 2015). In it I question whether Cassam succeeds in his challenge to Richard Moran's account of first-personal authority, and whether Doris is right that experimental evidence for unconscious influences on behavior generates skeptical worries on accounts that regard accurate self-knowledge as a precondition of agency.

Similar books and articles

The emplotted self: Self-deception and self-knowledge.Rachel Brown - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.
Self-deception and confabulation.William Hirstein - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.
Self-Knowledge for Humans.Quassim Cassam - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Critical Study: Cassam on Self‐Knowledge for Humans.Matthew Boyle - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):337-348.
Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
Self-knowledge and rationality.Thomas Spitzley - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):73 - 88.


Added to PP

1,346 (#5,806)

6 months
69 (#26,404)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Schwenkler
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references