Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2018)

Authors
Elizabeth Schechter
Indiana University, Bloomington
Abstract
Elizabeth Schechter explores the implications of the experience of people who have had the pathway between the two hemispheres of their brain severed, and argues that there are in fact two minds, subjects of experience, and intentional agents inside each split-brain human being: right and left. But each split-brain subject is still one of us.
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ISBN(s) 9780198809654   0198809654
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Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):125-130.
Brain Death: What We Are and When We Die.Lukas Meier - 2020 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews

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