Philosophical Studies 161 (1):109-117 (2012)
Lehrer Semantics, as it was devised by Adrienne and Keith Lehrer, is imbedded in a comprehensive web of thought and observations of language use and development, communication, and social interaction, all these as empirical phenomena. Rather than for a theory, I take it for a ‘‘model’’ of the kind which gives us guidance in how to organize linguistic and language-related phenomena. My comments on it are restricted to three aspects: In 2 I deal with the question of how Lehrerian sense can be empirically distinguished from Lehrerian reference as a precondition for the claim that sense relationships are in general more stable than reference relations. It seems that this very claim must already be presupposed for doing the respective empirical investigation. But in 3, I argue for the option to interpret the Lehrers’ concept of sense resp. sense vectors as intension concepts, by which move one may gain a generalized concept, so-to-say ‘‘graded analyticity’’, containing Carnapian strict analyticity for language systems as the extreme case of sense vectors with maximum value. Such graded sense may also be empirically investigated in the case of normal languages. In 4, I plead for my view that what the Lehrers take for communal languages are really collections of family-resembling idiolects of individual speakers and hypotheses of individual speakers about the idiolects of their fellow speakers. This move should free us from the fiction of, and sterile discussions about, the ‘‘true’’ meanings of words, but nevertheless keep normal language communication possible. As a concluding remark I propose in 5 to have both: normal languages from an empirical point of view, and codified languages from a logical reconstructionist one.
|Keywords||Analyticity Communication Explication Intension Meaning Semantics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
My Basic Conceptions of Probability and Induction, PA Schilpp Ed.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill., Open Court.
Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages.Rudolf Carnap - 1955 - Philosophical Studies 6 (3):33 - 47.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics.Jerrold J. Katz - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):1-28.
Semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity).H. G. Callaway - 1981 - Proceedings of the Southwestern Philosophical Association; Philosophical Topics 1981 (summer):93-103.
Objectivity Without Objects.Eli Hirsch - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:189-197.
Communication And The Complexity of Semantics.Peter Pagin - 2012 - In Markus Werning, Wolfram Hinzen & Edouard Machery (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford University Press.
Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity).H. G. Callaway - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?: And Other Essays.Howard K. Wettstein - 1991 - Stanford University Press.
Meaning, Interpretation.Martin Stokhof - 2002 - In D. Beaver & P. Scotto di Luzio (eds.), Words, Proofs, and Diagrams. CSLI Publications. pp. 217-240.
Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense From Reference, Analyticity is Cheap but Useless.Jonathan Cohen - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):115-135.
Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (4):328-43.
Added to index2012-04-20
Total downloads17 ( #281,046 of 2,158,880 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #354,157 of 2,158,880 )
How can I increase my downloads?