Seeing it all clearly: The real story on blurry vision

American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301 (2002)
Authors
Robert Schroer
University of Minnesota, Duluth
Abstract
Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience supervenes upon its representational content. The phenomenon of blurry vision is thought to raise a difficulty for this position. More specifically, it is alleged that representationalists cannot account for the phenomenal difference between clearly seeing an indistinct edge and blurrily seeing a distinct edge solely in terms of represented features of the surrounding environment. I defend representationalism from this objection by offering a novel account of the phenomenal difference between these two kinds of cases.
Keywords Epistemology  Experience  Perception  Representationalism  Vision
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Pictorial Experience: Not so Special After All.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.
Blur and Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):254-260.

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