Searles kritik am funktionalismus — eine untersuchung Des chinesischzimmers

Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.
Keywords functionalism  intentionality  simulation  mental state
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01801213
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,511
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity.David J. Cole - 1991 - Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
Searle, Syntax, and Observer-Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.
Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality.Anthonie W. M. Meijers - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Searle's Experiments with Thought.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (June):271-9.
A Dilemma for Searle's Argument for the Connection Principle.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):194-5.
Searle's Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - unknown - Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Searle on Strong AI.Philip Cam - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):103-8.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
10 ( #438,026 of 2,180,731 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #154,335 of 2,180,731 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums