Slaves of the Passions

Oxford University Press (2007)
Abstract
Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record straight, by advancing a version of the Humean theory of reasons which withstands this sophisticated array of objections. Schroeder defends a radical new view which, if correct, means that the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely misunderstood. Along the way, he raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action.
Keywords Ethics  Act (Philosophy  Agent (Philosophy  Emotions (Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2009
Buy the book $27.60 used (70% off)   $61.28 new (32% off)   $73.15 direct from Amazon (19% off)    Amazon page
Call number BJ1031.S35 2007
ISBN(s) 9780199299508   0199299501     9780199575725
DOI 10.1093/analys/anp049
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,655
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True?Kate Manne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.
Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.

View all 85 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Desires as Reasons.Yonatan Shemmer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):326–348.
The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.
The Doctrine of Internal Reasons.H. Lillehammer - 2000 - Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):507-516.
The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.
In Defence of Proportionalism.Daan Evers - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):313-320.
Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

89 ( #57,384 of 2,158,205 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #87,457 of 2,158,205 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums