Oxford University Press (2007)

Authors
Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California
Abstract
Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record straight, by advancing a version of the Humean theory of reasons which withstands this sophisticated array of objections. Schroeder defends a radical new view which, if correct, means that the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely misunderstood. Along the way, he raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action.
Keywords Ethics  Act (Philosophy  Agent (Philosophy  Emotions (Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2009
Call number BJ1031.S35 2007
ISBN(s) 9780199299508   0199299501   9780199575725
DOI 10.1093/analys/anp049
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,514
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA
Motivation, Knowledge, and Virtue

This chapter extends the results of Chapter 8 to views about motivation, virtue, and knowledge. Since Hypotheticalism rejects Proportionalism, simple versions of internalism are rejected, and the view is defended that there are many ways in which someone can fail to be motivated in accorda... see more

Why be Humean?

This chapter summarizes the key ideas advanced in the book and offers positive motivation for Hypotheticalism. Some advantages of Hypotheticalism derive from the fact that it is a reductive theory of the normative. A second class of advantages derives from its treatment of the weight of re... see more

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.

View all 226 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.
The Doctrine of Internal Reasons.H. Lillehammer - 2000 - Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):507-516.
Desires as Reasons.Yonatan Shemmer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):326–348.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
140 ( #65,185 of 2,348,205 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #237,421 of 2,348,205 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes