Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):497-518 (2011)

Eric Schliesser
University of Amsterdam
In this paper I offer three main challenges to James (2011). All three turn on the nature of philosophy and secure knowledge in Spinoza. First, I criticize James's account of the epistemic role that experience plays in securing adequate ideas for Spinoza. In doing so I criticize her treatment of what is known as the ‘conatus doctrine’ in Spinoza in order to challenge her picture of the relationship between true religion and philosophy. Second, this leads me into a criticism of her account of the nature of philosophy in Spinoza. I argue it is less piecemeal and less akin to what we would recognize as ‘science’ than she suggests. Third, I argue against James's core commitment that Spinoza's three kinds of knowledge differ in degree; I claim they differ in kind. My argument will offer a new interpretation of Spinoza's conception of ‘common notions’. Moreover, I argue that Spinozistic adequate knowledge involves something akin to angelic disembodiment
Keywords Spinoza  Common Notions  Philosophy  Angels
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00321.x
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References found in this work BETA

Principles of Philosophy.René Descartes, Valentine Rodger Miller & Reese P. Miller - 1983 - Reidel Distributed by Kluwer Boston, C1983.
Adequacy and Innateness in Spinoza.Eugene Marshall - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:51-88.

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Citations of this work BETA

Newton and Spinoza: On Motion and Matter (and God, of Course).Eric Schliesser - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):436-458.

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