Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge
Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285 (2012)
Abstract
Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in defeating knowledge by defeating epistemic rationality—the very kind of rationality that is entailed by knowledge, and in which Pascalian considerations do not play any role—even though epistemic rationality consists in having adequate evidence.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-011-9718-1
My notes
Similar books and articles
Comments on Crispin Wright on basic arithmetical knowledge.Anthony Brueckner - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):149-154.
Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Precis of When Truth Gives Out. [REVIEW]Mark Richard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):441-444.
Précis of Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):431-434.
Sosa on easy knowledge and the problem of the criterion.James Van Cleve - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):19-28.
Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Pragmatic encroachment, stakes, and religious knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Analytics
Added to PP
2010-06-25
Downloads
476 (#22,302)
6 months
17 (#61,850)
2010-06-25
Downloads
476 (#22,302)
6 months
17 (#61,850)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.
References found in this work
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.