The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences

Noûs 51 (4):667-685 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence, agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy-centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy-centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy.

Similar books and articles

Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.
Chancy accuracy and imprecise credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.
Accuracy and Evidence.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):579-596.
A dilemma for the imprecise bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.
Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-14

Downloads
402 (#50,452)

6 months
160 (#20,849)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.
Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.
Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.

View all 44 references / Add more references