The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences

Noûs 51 (4):667-685 (2017)

Authors
Miriam Schoenfield
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence, agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy-centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy-centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/nous.12105
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,253
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
Reason and the Grain of Belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
A Forward Looking Decision Rule for Imprecise Credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.
Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.
Chancy Accuracy and Imprecise Credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.
Accuracy and Evidence.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):579-596.
A Dilemma for the Imprecise Bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.
Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 229--251.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-07-14

Total views
89 ( #92,676 of 2,269,762 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #171,228 of 2,269,762 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature