The atheist's free will offence

This paper criticizes the assumption,omnipresent in contemporary philosophy ofreligion, that a perfectly good and loving Godwould wish to confer on (at least some) finitepersons free will. An alternative mode ofDivine-human relationship is introduced andshown to be as conducive to the realization ofvalue as one involving free will.Certain implications of this result are thenrevealed, to wit, that the theists free willdefence against the problem of evil isunsuccessful, and what is more, that free will,if it exists, provides positive support foratheism.
Keywords Philosophy
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John Bishop & Ken Perszyk (2011). The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):109-126.

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