Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19 (2008)

Authors
Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement. The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
Keywords Truthmaker  Commitment  Grounding  Fundamental
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.
Parts Generate the Whole but They Are Not Identical to It.Ross P. Cameron - 2014 - In Aaron J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
Monism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fundamentality And Modal Freedom.Jennifer Wang - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):397-418.
Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding.Paul Audi - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):567-590.

View all 45 citations / Add more citations

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