Truthmaker commitments

Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19 (2008)
Abstract
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement. The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
Keywords Truthmaker  Commitment  Grounding  Fundamental
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.

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Citations of this work BETA
How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.
Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.
Grounds and ‘Grounds’.Bradley Rettler - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):631-655.
The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment.Bradley Rettler - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1405-1425.
Minimal Truthmakers.Donnchadh O'Conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism.Ross P. Cameron - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.
How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular.Jamin Asay - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3):293-310.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.
Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers.Jamin Asay - 2011 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches?Peter Schulte - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):249-268.
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Discussion
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2009-05-15
Cross-posted from http://mleseminar.wordpress.com/

...

This week we discussed Schaffer’s ‘Truthmaker Commitments’, which is a critique of a certain view of ontological commitment associated with Armstrong and with Ross Cameron. It’s worth reading Cameron’s reply to Schaffer as well. No presentation to put here as yet; but the papers themselves are quite clear and concise. Various thoughts follow:

Gonzalo raised an issue about the notion of ‘implication’ being used by the quantifier view. If a theory’s ontological commitments are what it says exists, as Schaffer glosses it, then a theory is committed to certain entailments of the particular sentences or propositions which explicitly make it up. But a theory’s commitment should not include necessary existents, whose existence is entailed by any set of sentences. Perhaps, though, this is a problem more with this gloss on the quantifier view than an objection to Quine’s own view.

Schaffer could have said more in defence of the quantifier view ... (read more)


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