The Direct Argument and the burden of proof

Analysis 72 (1):25-36 (2012)
Abstract
Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr134
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References found in this work BETA
Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.

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Citations of this work BETA
Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Justin A. Capes - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1477-1495.

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