Erkenntnis 72 (3):337 - 351 (2010)
Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of Bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Adam Elga - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
Citations of this work BETA
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Belief Update Across Fission: Figure 1.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.
Similar books and articles
Indexical Thought.David Pitt - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 49.
Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity.Desheng Zong - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):608-623.
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