Res Philosophica 95 (1):189-197 (2017)

Authors
Jonah N. Schupbach
University of Utah
Abstract
This paper responds to Terry Horgan’s recent critique of Bayesian formal epistemology. I argue that each of Horgan’s criticisms misses its mark when Bayesianism is viewed as putting forward an inductive logic of confidences. Along the way, I explore the nature, scope, and limits of a defensible brand of Bayesianism.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
ISBN(s) 2168-9105
DOI 10.11612/resphil.1652
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References found in this work BETA

Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):233-255.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Arthur W. Burks - 1951 - Journal of Philosophy 48 (17):524-535.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame

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