Third-person internalism: A critical examination of externalism and a foundation-oriented alternative [Book Review]
Acta Analytica 23 (1):9-28 (2008)
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Abstract |
This paper starts with an examination of the major problems of foundation-oriented epistemology in Sect. 2. Then, in Sects. 3–4, it is argued that the externalistic re-definition of knowledge deprives this concept from useful applications to human’s epistemic practice. From the viewpoint of cultural evolution, the condition of justification is the most important ingredient of knowledge. An alternative foundation-oriented conception of knowledge called third-person internalism is developed in Sect. 2 and Sect. 5. It combines insights of externalism with the requirement of second-order justification. The application of third-person internalism to contextualistic positions leads to an important constraint on contextualism (Sect. 6). The final section (Sect. 7) sketches new prospects for a foundation-oriented epistemology which are based on epistemic optimality arguments.
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Keywords | Internalism Externalism Third-person internalism Meliorative epistemology Epistemic optimality |
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DOI | 10.1007/s12136-008-0016-2 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Optimality Justifications: New Foundations for Foundation-Oriented Epistemology.Gerhard Schurz - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3877-3897.
Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games.Gerhard Schurz - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):200-220.
Abductive Belief Revision in Science.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 77--104.
Changing Minds About Climate Change: Belief Revision, Coherence, and Emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.
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