The luck argument against event-causal libertarianism: It is here to stay

Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385 (2014)
Authors
Markus E. Schlosser
University College Dublin
Abstract
The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal libertarianism against four formulations of the luck argument. I will argue that three of Franklin’s responses are unsuccessful and that there are important versions of the luck challenge that his defense has left unaddressed
Keywords Free will  Incompatibilism  Event-causal libertarianism  Luck argument  Causal theory of action
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0102-1
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References found in this work BETA

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.

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