Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369 (2011)

Authors
Markus E. Schlosser
University College Dublin
Abstract
This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.
Keywords Rule-following  Reasoning  Deviant causal chains  Dispositions  Metaphysics of mind  Metaphysics of agency
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9577-1
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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Citations of this work BETA

Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Agency.Markus E. Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dispositions.Michael Fara - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dispositions.Sungho Choi - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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