The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience

Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48 (2010)
Authors
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
Keywords Perception  Hallucination  Phenomenal Character  Perceptual Particularity  Representationalism  Relationalism  Naive Realism  Disjunctivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9540-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

View all 57 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perceptual Phenomenology.Bence Nanay - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):235-246.
The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life.Galen Strawson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--325.
Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Boyd Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage?Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
The Transcendental Significance of Phenomenology.Stephen White - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
Introduction: Perceptual Experience.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--30.
The Unity of Hallucinations.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.
Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-11-21

Total downloads
1,176 ( #1,006 of 2,266,863 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
136 ( #2,012 of 2,266,863 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature