Authors
Jonah N. Schupbach
University of Utah
Abstract
In, I put forward a “possibility result” for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert argues that the specific ceteris paribus conditions I consider are “jointly inconsistent”. In this article, I prove to the contrary that these conditions can consistently be enforced while allowing degrees of coherence to vary. Next, I consider a related criticism, inspired by Olsson’s constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle that should guide one in choosing appropriately stringent ceteris paribus conditions.En planteo un “resultado de posibilidad” para el bayesianismo coherentista mostrando que existen conjuntos plausibles de condiciones ceteris paribus que implican que la coherencia conduce a la verdad. Schubert argumenta en contra de este resultado que las condiciones ceteris paribus que considero son “inconsistentes tomadas conjuntamente”. En este articulo demuestro, sin embargo, que estas condiciones pueden ser satisfechas permitiendo que los grados de coherencia varien. Abordo despues una critica relacionada con la anterior e inspirada en los requisitos impuestos por Olsson a las condiciones ceteris paribus. Eso lleva a una discusion general del principio, o principios, que deberia guiarnos para elegir unas condiciones ceterisparibus que sean apropiadas, es decir, que no sean ni muy restrictivas, ni demasiado laxas.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI 10.1387/theoria.11725
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References found in this work BETA

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338–345.
What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
On the Alleged Impossibility of Bayesian Coherentism.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):323-331.

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