The rationalist foundations of Chalmers's 2-d semantics

Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):227-255 (2004)
Authors
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Abstract
In Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers seeks to develop a version of 2-D semantics which can vindicate the rationalist claim that there are constitutive connections between meaning, possibility and a priority. Chalmers lays out different ways of filling in his preferred epistemic approach to 2-D semantics so as to avoid controversial philosophical assumptions. In these comments, however, I argue that there are some distinctively rationalist commitments in Chalmers's epistemic approach to 2-D semantics. I start by explaining why Chalmers's approach requires a canonical language that affords subjects accurate a priori access to the space of possibility. I then argue that traditional worries about rationalism will simply re-emerge as worries about whether there can be a canonical vocabulary and how we could come to recognize one if there were. The moral is that Chalmers's 2-D semantic framework builds in substantive metaphysical and epistemological commitments which stand in need of further defense
Keywords Dimension  Epistemic  Logic  Modal Logic  Rationalism  Semantics  Chalmers, D
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019547.96461.d9
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Against A Priori Reductions.Laura Schroeter - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586.

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