The role of sensory experience in epistemic justification: A problem for coherentism [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):177-191 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The author argues that coherence views of justification, in spite of their crucial insight into the interpenetration of our beliefs, neglect a key constraint on justification: they are unable to accommodate the epistemic significance of experience. Epistemic justification is not just a function of our beliefs and their interrelations. Both, beliefs and experiences, are relevant to the justification of an empirical belief. Experience is not itself a form of belief or disposition to believe; it cannot be analyzed in doxastic terms. And, yet, nondoxastic experiences play a justificatory role, not merely a causal role. The positive epistemic status of a perceptual belief depends upon being appeared to in appropriate ways. It is important that, for an ordinary perceptual belief to be justified, one does not have to believe that one is appeared to in these ways. It is the experiences themselves, the ways of being appeared to, not our beliefs about them, that are required for justification.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
The role of coherence in epistemic justification.T. Shogenji - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):90 – 106.
Experience and belief: Haack on the problem of empirical basis.H. Vahid - 1994 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (2):139 – 140.
The given regained: Reflections on the sensuous content of experience.Richard Schantz - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
Coherentism.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
106 (#161,409)

6 months
5 (#632,353)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis.Richard Schantz - 2015 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1):129-159.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York,: Humanities Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

View all 25 references / Add more references