Use-novel predictions and Mendeleev’s periodic table: response to Scerri and Worrall

Abstract
In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. . Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did indeed contribute to the acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise the latter on general grounds.Keywords: Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev; Noble gases; Use-novel predictions; Heuristic account; Ad hoc hypotheses
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.008
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,396
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Prediction and the Periodic Table.Eric Scerri & John Worrall - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):407-452.
Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's? (I).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):95-123.
Novel Evidence and Severe Tests.Deborah G. Mayo - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552.
Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's? (II).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):223-262.
Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery.Patrick Maher - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:273 - 285.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
State of the Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters.Heather Douglas & P. Magnus - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):580-589.
Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure.Samuel Schindler - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):619-658.
Testability and Epistemic Shifts in Modern Cosmology.Helge Kragh - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (1):48-56.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
45 ( #129,345 of 2,225,985 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #181,863 of 2,225,985 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature