Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'

Noûs 48 (1):137-155 (2014)

Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Abstract
According to the Self-Location Thesis, one’s own location can be among the things that visual experience represents, even when one’s body is entirely out of view. By contrast, the Minimal View denies this, and says that visual experience represents things only as "to the right", etc., and never as "to the right of me". But the Minimal View is phenomenologically inadequate: it cannot explain the difference between a visual experience of self-motion and one of an oppositely moving world. To show this, I argue (i) that these experiences are different in an important respect, (ii) that this difference is genuinely experiential, (iii) that it is visual, (iv) that it is not purely phenomenal, and (v) that it cannot be identified with anything other than the apparent motion of the self. So the Self-Location Thesis is upheld: reports of one’s own motion can correspond to aspects of visual experiences every bit as basic to their contents as the apparent motion or rest of the things one has in view
Keywords visual experience  self-consciousness  self-location
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00871.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Logic Of Perception.Irvin Rock - 1983 - Cambridge: MIT Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conscious Vision in Action.Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1435-1467.
Why Are Indexicals Essential?Simon James Prosser - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):211-233.
De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves1.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Spatial Location in Color Vision.Ian Gold - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):59-62.
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
Visual Stuff and Active Vision.Wayne Wright - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
Impartial Perception.David H. Sanford - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (225):392 - 395.
Extended Vision.Robert A. Wilson - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action and Consciousness. Oxford University Press..
Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Boyd Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Research Article.[author unknown] - 2004 - Minds and Machines 10 (4):583-584.
Where Was I?David H. Sanford - 1981 - In D. R. Hofstadter & D. C. Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul. New York: Basic Books. pp. 232-40.
Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field.David M. Rosenthal - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-06-05

Total views
1,036 ( #1,783 of 2,319,691 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
75 ( #5,603 of 2,319,691 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature