Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology

Dissertation, University of California Berkeley (1997)
Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.
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