Abstract
Starting from a brief recapitulation of the contemporary debate on scientific realism, this paper argues for the following thesis: Assume a theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of application A, but was superseded later on by a superior theory T*, which was likewise successful in A but has an arbitrarily different theoretical superstructure. Then under natural conditions T contains certain theoretical expressions, which yielded T's empirical success, such that these T-expressions correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*, and given T* is true, they refer indirectly to the entities denoted by these expressions of T*. The thesis is first motivated by a study of the phlogiston–oxygen example. Then the thesis is proved in the form of a logical theorem, and illustrated by further examples. The final sections explain how the correspondence theorem justifies scientific realism and work out the advantages of the suggested account.1. Introduction: Pessimistic Meta-induction vs. Structural Correspondence2. The Case of the Phlogiston Theory3. Steps Towards a Systematic Correspondence Theorem4. The Correspondence Theorem and Its Ontological Interpretation5. Further Historical Applications6. Discussion of the Correspondence Theorem: Objections and Replies7. Consequences for Scientific Realism and Comparison with Other Positions 7.1. Comparison with constructive empiricism7.2. Major difference from standard scientific realism7.3. From minimal realism and correspondence to scientific realism7.4. Comparison with particular realistic positions.